Your Company Is Most of Your Net Worth. That Is a Position, Not a Strategy.
Smart Advisors Team
Ask a founder what he is worth and he will quote you the company valuation. Ask him to write out a personal balance sheet and the conversation gets quieter. The equity of one unlisted company, usually the single largest line, sits next to a salary paid by that same company, a house mortgaged to secure its working capital limit, and a personal guarantee on its term debt. One asset. One income stream. One source of risk. That is not conviction in your business. It is an unhedged, illiquid, leveraged position in a single private security that has never been sized, priced or stress-tested. Size the position before you argue about it Most promoters carry a number in their head that comes from the last funding round or a broker conversation. That number is not a net worth. It is a headline enterprise value, and several things sit between it and money in your account. Take a simple illustration. Say the business is spoken about at an enterprise value of 100 and carries net debt of 20, so equity value is 80. You hold 60 per cent, which puts 48 on your mental balance sheet. Now apply the deductions a real transaction applies. If an earlier round carried a liquidation preference, invested capital comes out ahead of you in any downside outcome. A secondary sale of a minority stake rarely clears at the primary price, so assume a discount. A share of consideration is typically held in escrow or tied to a holdback for twelve to eighteen months. Capital gains tax applies on exit, and the treatment depends on holding period and structure. By the time those four pass through, the 48 in your head may be closer to 30 in cash, received in tranches, more than a year after you sign. That second number is the one that belongs on your personal balance sheet, and it is worth writing down annually. The real exposure is correlation, not size Concentration by itself is not the problem. Concentration is how almost every operating fortune gets built, and no founder should apologise for backing his own business. The problem is that in most founder-led companies, four separate exposures are all the same bet. Your net worth is in the equity. Your household income is a salary from the same entity. Your personal property secures its credit lines. Your guarantee stands behind its term debt. These do not fail independently. A lost anchor customer, a receivable blow-up, a regulatory shift or an input cost shock moves all of them in the same direction at the same time. That is the structural flaw. The moment you most need personal liquidity is the moment the asset is hardest to sell, the buyer pool is thinnest, and the lender is reviewing the guarantee. Diversification here has nothing to do with belief in the business. It is about making sure the company's worst quarter is not automatically your family's worst year. What taking money off the table actually costs Founders resist partial liquidity for three reasons, and all three deserve a straight answer. Signalling is the first. A promoter selling a slice of his holding alongside a primary round, where the company takes most of the money and he takes a minority of it, reads as sensible de-risking. A promoter pushing a large pure secondary with no primary alongside it reads as an exit attempt, and buyers price that. The structure determines the signal, not the act. Control is the second, and it is usually overstated. Selling ten or fifteen per cent of your holding changes the shareholding table; it does not hand over the board, the reserved matters or the operating mandate unless you negotiate those away. Price is the third and the only real one. Minority secondary paper trades below primary because it brings no new capital into the business, carries weaker rights and funds no growth. That discount is a genuine cost. But it is finite, visible and known in advance. The cost of a fully concentrated position meeting a bad outcome is none of those three. Four routes, and when each one fits Secondary alongside a primary round is the cleanest route, and it is available only when demand exceeds the company's capital requirement. If investors want to put in more than the business needs, that surplus can buy existing shares instead of creating dilution the business cannot deploy. Keep the promoter component modest relative to primary so the optics stay right. Promoter funding or a loan against shares solves liquidity without giving up upside, and it is the route to treat with most caution. You are borrowing against the same correlated asset. It fixes the cash problem and makes the concentration problem worse, because a valuation reset triggers a margin call at the exact point the business is already under pressure. Use it only where an exit or refinancing is genuinely visible inside the facility tenure and the loan to value leaves room for a downward revision in the share price. Two routes sit outside an equity round altogether. Dividend and compensation policy is the dullest and the most neglected: a profitable business with stable cash conversion and no near-term capex need that distributes nothing is making an active choice to keep all shareholder value locked inside an illiquid instrument, and that choice should be made deliberately and tax-efficiently rather than by default. A majority sale with rollover equity suits owners who want to crystallise most of the value while keeping a minority holding for a second realisation under new ownership; it is the right answer more often than founders expect. Set the threshold before the term sheet arrives Two tests are worth running now, not in the middle of a process. First, the survival test. If your equity were worth nothing tomorrow, could the household run for twenty-four to thirty-six months and absorb any guarantee that gets called? If the answer is no, personal liquidity is not a preference. It is a risk control you have not implemented. Second, the judgement test. How much would you need outside the business to make decisions on merit rather than need? Founders holding everything inside the company make two expensive mistakes. They accept the first serious offer because they need the cash, or they refuse good offers because the asset is simultaneously their net worth and their identity. A threshold set in advance, as a percentage of net worth you are willing to leave concentrated, removes both failure modes. Concentration is how most operating wealth is created. Staying fully concentrated indefinitely is how a meaningful share of it is lost. The distinction worth holding on to is between the money that is still working for you and the money that only has to be safe. Mark your company equity once a year at a realistic post-preference, post-discount, post-tax number, decide what proportion of your net worth you are prepared to leave sitting there, and act on the gap. If you do not set that number, a buyer, a lender or an event eventually will, and none of them will ask what you would have preferred. Disclaimer This article is for general information only and does not constitute financial, investment, tax, legal, or professional advice. The views expressed are for general informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice specific to your business or circumstances. Please seek appropriate professional advice before making any business, financial, investment, or transaction-related decision.
Ask a founder what he is worth and he will quote you the company valuation. Ask him to write out a personal balance sheet and the conversation gets quieter. The equity of one unlisted company, usually the single largest line, sits next to a salary paid by that same company, a house mortgaged to secure its working capital limit, and a personal guarantee on its term debt. One asset. One income stream. One source of risk. That is not conviction in your business. It is an unhedged, illiquid, leveraged position in a single private security that has never been sized, priced or stress-tested. Size the position before you argue about it Most promoters carry a number in their head that comes from the last funding round or a broker conversation. That number is not a net worth. It is a headline enterprise value, and several things sit between it and money in your account. Take a simple illustration. Say the business is spoken about at an enterprise value of 100 and carries net debt of 20, so equity value is 80. You hold 60 per cent, which puts 48 on your mental balance sheet. Now apply the deductions a real transaction applies. If an earlier round carried a liquidation preference, invested capital comes out ahead of you in any downside outcome. A secondary sale of a minority stake rarely clears at the primary price, so assume a discount. A share of consideration is typically held in escrow or tied to a holdback for twelve to eighteen months. Capital gains tax applies on exit, and the treatment depends on holding period and structure. By the time those four pass through, the 48 in your head may be closer to 30 in cash, received in tranches, more than a year after you sign. That second number is the one that belongs on your personal balance sheet, and it is worth writing down annually. The real exposure is correlation, not size Concentration by itself is not the problem. Concentration is how almost every operating fortune gets built, and no founder should apologise for backing his own business. The problem is that in most founder-led companies, four separate exposures are all the same bet. Your net worth is in the equity. Your household income is a salary from the same entity. Your personal property secures its credit lines. Your guarantee stands behind its term debt. These do not fail independently. A lost anchor customer, a receivable blow-up, a regulatory shift or an input cost shock moves all of them in the same direction at the same time. That is the structural flaw. The moment you most need personal liquidity is the moment the asset is hardest to sell, the buyer pool is thinnest, and the lender is reviewing the guarantee. Diversification here has nothing to do with belief in the business. It is about making sure the company's worst quarter is not automatically your family's worst year. What taking money off the table actually costs Founders resist partial liquidity for three reasons, and all three deserve a straight answer. Signalling is the first. A promoter selling a slice of his holding alongside a primary round, where the company takes most of the money and he takes a minority of it, reads as sensible de-risking. A promoter pushing a large pure secondary with no primary alongside it reads as an exit attempt, and buyers price that. The structure determines the signal, not the act. Control is the second, and it is usually overstated. Selling ten or fifteen per cent of your holding changes the shareholding table; it does not hand over the board, the reserved matters or the operating mandate unless you negotiate those away. Price is the third and the only real one. Minority secondary paper trades below primary because it brings no new capital into the business, carries weaker rights and funds no growth. That discount is a genuine cost. But it is finite, visible and known in advance. The cost of a fully concentrated position meeting a bad outcome is none of those three. Four routes, and when each one fits Secondary alongside a primary round is the cleanest route, and it is available only when demand exceeds the company's capital requirement. If investors want to put in more than the business needs, that surplus can buy existing shares instead of creating dilution the business cannot deploy. Keep the promoter component modest relative to primary so the optics stay right. Promoter funding or a loan against shares solves liquidity without giving up upside, and it is the route to treat with most caution. You are borrowing against the same correlated asset. It fixes the cash problem and makes the concentration problem worse, because a valuation reset triggers a margin call at the exact point the business is already under pressure. Use it only where an exit or refinancing is genuinely visible inside the facility tenure and the loan to value leaves room for a downward revision in the share price. Two routes sit outside an equity round altogether. Dividend and compensation policy is the dullest and the most neglected: a profitable business with stable cash conversion and no near-term capex need that distributes nothing is making an active choice to keep all shareholder value locked inside an illiquid instrument, and that choice should be made deliberately and tax-efficiently rather than by default. A majority sale with rollover equity suits owners who want to crystallise most of the value while keeping a minority holding for a second realisation under new ownership; it is the right answer more often than founders expect. Set the threshold before the term sheet arrives Two tests are worth running now, not in the middle of a process. First, the survival test. If your equity were worth nothing tomorrow, could the household run for twenty-four to thirty-six months and absorb any guarantee that gets called? If the answer is no, personal liquidity is not a preference. It is a risk control you have not implemented. Second, the judgement test. How much would you need outside the business to make decisions on merit rather than need? Founders holding everything inside the company make two expensive mistakes. They accept the first serious offer because they need the cash, or they refuse good offers because the asset is simultaneously their net worth and their identity. A threshold set in advance, as a percentage of net worth you are willing to leave concentrated, removes both failure modes. Concentration is how most operating wealth is created. Staying fully concentrated indefinitely is how a meaningful share of it is lost. The distinction worth holding on to is between the money that is still working for you and the money that only has to be safe. Mark your company equity once a year at a realistic post-preference, post-discount, post-tax number, decide what proportion of your net worth you are prepared to leave sitting there, and act on the gap. If you do not set that number, a buyer, a lender or an event eventually will, and none of them will ask what you would have preferred. Disclaimer This article is for general information only and does not constitute financial, investment, tax, legal, or professional advice. The views expressed are for general informational purposes and should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice specific to your business or circumstances. Please seek appropriate professional advice before making any business, financial, investment, or transaction-related decision.
